Naval War College Review
Volume 74
Number 4 Autumn 2021

Article 20

2021

Coalition of the UnWilling and UnAble: European Realignment and
the Future of American Geopolitics
Ryan C. Hendrickson
John R. Deni

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review

Recommended Citation
Hendrickson, Ryan C. and Deni, John R. (2021) "Coalition of the UnWilling and UnAble: European
Realignment and the Future of American Geopolitics," Naval War College Review: Vol. 74 : No. 4 , Article
20.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/20

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval
War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

160

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Hendrickson and Deni: Coalition of the UnWilling and UnAble: European Realignment and t

the sea’s ability to link us back to our
forebears. As Professor Holmes states,
“Seafarers join something larger and
older when they go down to the sea
in ships” (p. 14). Not only does the
sea connect us as a global community,
but it also has the ability to connect
us with our past and with our naval
and military history and heritage.
Wardrooms and classrooms would do
well to add Maritime Strategy to their list
of books to discuss. Training commands
should consider including this book
in their curricula for new accessions,
as it provides a big-picture view of the
Navy’s place on the national scene.
SCOTT CAUBLE

Coalition of the UnWilling and UnAble: European
Realignment and the Future of American Geopolitics, by John R. Deni. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 2021. 274 pages. $75.

In this exceptional and contemporary
analysis, John R. Deni provides a
sobering view of the largest U.S.
European military allies and their
abilities to function as effective partners.
In short, the current and future pictures
are not pretty. As the book’s title
indicates, whether one considers the
United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Italy, or Poland, these states suffer from
considerable—arguably profound—military limitations that will circumscribe
their ability to serve as military partners
to the United States. Likewise, whether
one focuses on demographics (declining
birth rates), national economies that
cannot support military ambitions,
the absence of advanced military
capabilities, or strategic directions
that do not square well with those of
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the United States, the applicability
to these allies of all these factors, to
varying degrees, helps to explain how
significant the barriers in place are.
Certainly, previous scholarship has
examined European military shortcomings. Many have written on American
military preeminence in NATO’s
operation in Kosovo; others have
demonstrated the different strategic
perspectives and European military limitations apparent in NATO’s bombings in
Libya. Deni provides an updated analysis
that looks closely at the historical “big
four” European allies, plus Poland.
For the United Kingdom, Deni
notes that over the last decade major
reductions in defense expenditures
have cut deeply into British military
capabilities. He also devotes much
analysis to the British economy,
noting that Brexit similarly will cut
deeply into Britain’s tax base, effectively
preventing the British from investing
in their military forces, even if they
had the political desire to do so.
The author’s contrasting analysis of
Germany is especially perceptive and
revealing. He makes the case that the
Germans’ strong and robust economy,
favorable labor market, and budget
surpluses provide the potential for them
to play a far more significant role in
global security. The German public,
however, remains generally opposed
to the projection of German military
force; opinion polls even indicate that
Germans are among the least likely,
compared with respondents from other
European allies, to express a willingness
to use force to defend another NATO
ally if it got into a “serious military
conflict” with Russia (p. 72). Politicalelite and youth opinions differ on this
point, yet the dominant norm remains
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in place, which has translated into
“debilitating shortcomings” for German
military capabilities, despite having
an economy that truly has prospered
and will continue to do so (p. 66).
Deni sees France as the closest U.S.
ally in terms of strategic outlook; the
French hold views nearly identical to
Americans’ in these areas, and their
perspectives on the role of the military
as a foreign policy tool are similar
as well. But the author argues that
France’s foreign and military visions
cannot be sustained, owing to the
country’s inadequate economic growth.
Moreover, some political-sovereignty
issues still stand in the way of morefruitful interstate dialogue.
Among the allies examined, Italy
stands out as the one that has fallen the
furthest. Owing to a deeply troubled
economy and a backward environment
on technology and innovation—along
with the inability of political moderates
to face these challenges effectively,
which has resulted in the rise of populist
politicians—the Italian military is only
a shadow of what it once was, with the
likely prospect of additional languishing ahead. With an aging population
and a military that increasingly is
used as an internal dual-use security
force, Italy’s prospects as a meaningful
military ally continue to shrink.
Deni’s last study is devoted to Poland,
which, unlike nearly all other European
countries, has spent consistently and
meaningfully on defense over the entire
last decade. Russian military incursions
into Georgia, Crimea, and eastern
Ukraine, along with Russian military activities in Kaliningrad, build directly on
Poland’s historical fears of an aggressive
and expansionist Russia. Yet despite Poland’s economic strengths, new military
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capabilities, and legislation that requires
ongoing defense spending, it suffers a
severe limitation: its singular focus on
Russia, with its resultant investments in
territorial defense. This limits its ability
to partner with the United States.
The author concludes with several
recommendations for how to address
these significant shortcomings. Among
his proposals is sharing more American
military intelligence with allies, especially Germany, in an effort to increase
transparency on existing global threats
and challenges. Deni also recommends that the United States fully use
international organizations, including
the United Nations and NATO, given
the high strategic value the allies place
on them. And he encourages the United
States to support a strong European
security identity, which may help translate into greater defense spending, and
perhaps the development of specified
niche capabilities among the allies.
This book is impressive. Deni has used
an extensive body of scholarship and
data on each of these countries. He also
conducted a multitude of interviews
with both American and foreign
defense officials. While some of his
policy proposals certainly will generate
debate, his ideas are welcome, as they
provide some optimism that positive
change is possible and that policy
directions worth pursuing do exist.
RYAN C. HENDRICKSON

Dangerous Narratives: Warfare, Strategy, Statecraft, ed. Ajit K. Maan. Washington, DC: Narrative Strategies Ink, 2020. 188 pages. $45.

This century’s increased social media
and other forms of technological
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